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1 Intergenerational contracts and the
quantity–quality transition 
The concern of this article is with the
intergenerational transmission of poverty, a
particular manifestation of chronic poverty
(Hulme et al. 2001). Chronic poverty is defined
by its extended duration. It does not necessarily
describe the same phenomenon as extreme
poverty but it is highly probable that many
chronically poor people are also likely to be
extremely poor: the severity and intractability of
deprivation are likely to go hand in hand. The
transmission of poverty across generations occurs
through the transmission of various kinds of
deficit. In contexts where poor people rely
primarily on the sale of their labour power to
meet survival needs, the failure to invest in the
‘human capital’ of successive generations, their
education and skill, is likely to be a common
route through which the intergenerational
transmission of poverty occurs. While
investments in human capital can, in principle,
occur at any stage of the individual life course, in
practice, investments undertaken during
childhood have critical implications for
subsequent life chances. In most societies,
parents continue to play a critical role in
determining the nature of these investments. 
The idea of the ‘quantity–quality’ trade-off in
family formation strategies (Becker and Lewis
1973) makes the logical point that, given
resources constraints, there is a trade-off between
the number of children within a family and
investments in their human capital. This trade-
off provides a link between increasing
investments in children’s education and broader
processes of demographic transition and the shift
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from high to low fertility regimes. Historical
evidence suggests that large-scale declines in
fertility rarely take place till there has been a
decline in mortality. It also confirms that declines
in fertility have been accompanied in many parts
of the world by rising levels of education
(Montgomery et al. 1999; Kabeer 1996). 
In an earlier paper (2001), Kabeer sketches out a
stylised account of the changing nature of the
implicit intergenerational contracts between
parents and children in the context of
demographic change that might help to explain
the ‘quantity–quality’ transition in family
formation strategies. This included an ‘affective
transition’, the greater willingness on the part of
parents to invest emotionally in each individual
child as initial, largely ‘exogenous’, declines in
mortality increased the likelihood that children
would survive beyond the first precarious years of
life (Stone 1977; Scheper-Hughes 1992). A
second shift related to the greater sense of
personal agency that parents are able to exercise
in relation to family formation strategies as more
effective means for assuring both child survival
and birth control become available to them
(Cleland and Wilson 1987). This has been
variously described as part of a larger transition
from ‘accommodation’ to ‘intervention’ and by
Cleland and Wilson (1987) ‘from fatalism to a
sense of control of destiny’. As Montgomery
(1999: 20) points out, this does not necessarily
suggest that a sense of agency is absent in high-
mortality, pre-transitional societies, but rather
that the scope for strictly personal agency is
much more limited. 
A decline in mortality can lead to fertility decline
at the very minimum because it reduces the
‘insurance motivation’ for having children; in
other words, having enough children to ensure
that a certain number (sometimes of the
preferred sex) will survive to adulthood. Other
factors which accompany declining mortality
may further strengthen the desire for fertility
control. Similarly the availability of effective
means of birth control can act to hasten the
speed of fertility decline through a number of
different pathways: changes in the wider society
which reduce the ‘benefits’ or increase the ‘costs’
of large family size and, some have argued,
because it brings the fertility decision within the
‘calculus of conscious choice’ (Cleland and
Wilson 1987). 
As child survival becomes increasingly assured, as
parents begin to take an active role in how many
children they have rather than leaving it to fate
or divine will, a different form of decision-making
becomes possible, ‘one that involves forward-
looking strategies that play out over longer time
horizons’ (Montgomery 1999: 12). A transition in
time horizons permits the consideration of new
forms of investment in children which might not
have previously featured as possible options, even
at the level of imagination. 
Particularly for those close to the margins of
survival, education exemplifies an investment
which entails considerable risk. It requires
families to sacrifice current consumption in
favour of future returns. In an uncertain world, it
represents a statement of faith about the future:
about what the future will bring, about which
children will survive to take advantage of it, and
about their willingness to fulfil their obligations
to the generation that made the sacrifice.
Smaller family sizes make such investments
more affordable. The ‘quantity–quality’
transition has thus been described as transition
from family-building by fate to family-building
by design (Lloyd and Ivanov 1988). 
There is, as Montgomery points out, nothing
automatic or self-propelling about these
transitions. It may be one or more generations
before declines in mortality give rise to declines in
fertility and a further delay before parents become
more willing to invest in their children’s education.
Context matters for the pace of these transitions:
In the most basic sense, some level of
development is required before family size can
have an impact on child investment. In an
environment without schools or clinics,
parents have few ways to materially influence
their children’s health or schooling, whether
their resources are spread among many or
few. (Lloyd 1994; see also Desai 1993)
Parents’ assessments of potential returns to
investments in health or education will partly
depend on the quality of health and educational
services available and partly on likely
opportunities in the labour market (Lloyd 1994:
9). What appears to be key therefore is the
likelihood that the fertility transition will be
accompanied, or followed, by rising levels of
investment in children’s education. 
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2 Exploring the quantity–quality transition in
Bangladesh
Evidence suggests that a quantity–quality
transition is in process in Bangladesh. Declines
in child mortality and fertility have occurred in
recent decades as part and parcel of larger social
and economic change, including the spread of
the cash economy, the productivity gains of the
Green Revolution, increased ease of
communications and transport, the growing
importance of the media, and the proliferation of
contract-based relationships in place of previous
personalised patron–client ones. All of these
have directly or indirectly increased the value
attached to the acquisition of basic levels of
information and knowledge, particularly in the
context of engagement with markets and
services, and are likely to have contributed to a
remarkable rise in children’s education,
including girls’ education, at the national level. 
However, the pace of change has not been
uniform across the population. It has been slower
in poorer districts of Bangladesh and among
poorer households. At the same time, it is clear
that poverty is not an insurmountable barrier to
children’s education and that many children
from low-income households do go to school (see
overview in Kabeer 2003). The relationship
between household poverty and children’s
education appears to be mediated by a variety of
factors, including the child’s age and gender,
household livelihood strategies, parental
education and the availability and quality of
schooling. Severity of deprivation may also
matter. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)
explorations in rural Bangladesh suggest that
the very poor may have different priorities and
operate with different understandings of
intergenerational contracts from moderately
poor households. The very poor described their
most pressing needs in terms of three meals a
day, adequate housing and basic healthcare,
while the moderately poor specified concrete
housing, comprehensive health services and
education as their priorities (Hamid 1998). The
significance attached to education was thus one
of the factors which distinguished the poor from
the very poor. 
If failure to invest in children’s education is,
indeed, one of the forces driving the
intergenerational transmission of poverty, and if
poverty itself is one of the factors behind this
failure, we need a better understanding of the
relationship between household poverty and
children’s education. The aim of this article is to
revisit the idea of intergenerational contracts as
a framework for understanding the uneven pace
of the quantity–quality transition in the context
of urban Bangladesh. The analysis here draws on
quantitative data gathered through a household
survey carried out in 2001 in two slum
neighbourhoods (Pallabi and Agargaon) in
Dhaka. The survey covered 616 households,
roughly evenly divided between the two
neighbourhoods. A sub-component of the survey
was addressed to all children aged 5–15 in these
households; this covered 297 households.
Qualitative data was subsequently gathered
through in-depth interviews and focus group
discussions with parents, children and teachers.
3 Intergenerational contracts and children’s
education: findings from urban Bangladesh
As a first stage of the research, we explore the
evidence for the persistence of intergenerational
contracts in our sample population. Table 1
suggests that parents continue to have certain
expectations of support from their children.
They have high expectations of financial and
social support from sons and high expectations of
social but not financial support from daughters.
The picture in relation to financial expectations
reflects the reality of a culture that privileges
men, and constrains women, in access to
material resources, income and opportunities.
We find similar gender asymmetries expressed in
relation to ideal education levels for sons and
daughters, with higher educational ideals
expressed in relation to sons. There is not a
great deal of difference in these expressions of
expectations from children and obligations
towards children by age of parent. 
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Table 1 Parents’ different expectations of sons and
daughters in urban Bangladesh
Sons Daughters 
Financial dependence 92% 19%
Social dependence 78% 87%
Ideal education: primary 9% 32%
Ideal education: secondary 41% 45% 
Ideal education: higher 17% 10%
Graduate 32% 10%
However, an examination of percentages of
children who had ever been to school by age
cohort of the population suggests that there has
been a change over time (Table 2). Percentages
of children ever enrolled are higher and gender
disparities have all but disappeared in the
younger cohorts, echoing rising education levels
and declining gender disparities in the national
data (Kabeer 2003). It is also evident that ever-
enrolled figures overstate the extent of change.
Comparison of estimates in the 5–15 age group
suggest that current enrolment rates are much
lower than ever-enrolled rates, indicating that
dropout rates remain high: while around 70 per
cent of children were ever enrolled in school,
only 50–60 per cent of children are currently
going to school. A further disaggregation of this
age group shows that most of these dropouts
occur in the 13–15 age group when, presumably,
children are old enough to be sent to work or to
help out around the house. The table also shows
that around 10–20 per cent of children are
engaged in waged work. Most of these are from
the out-of-school category. 
Our findings, therefore, suggest uneven changes
in intergenerational contracts. Against a
background of rising levels of education in
younger age cohorts, our sample is divided into
parents who have managed to send and keep
their children in school and parents who have
either failed to enrol their children at school or
failed to keep them there. Interviews with
parents in the former category provide some
insights into why parents are increasingly
redefining their obligations to their children to
include investments in their education. There
was widespread acknowledgement that
education had increased in value over time to
the extent that it was now a necessity. As one
parent put it: 
Is there anything possible today without an
education? You need to be educated if you go for a job
in any garment factory, if you want to start a business
and even if you want to set up a shop. You need
education when you walk on the streets of Dhaka city:
what is written on this sign says and what is written
on that sign. What number stands for what, looking
for a house, finding a place.
However, the value of education was interpreted
differently for sons and daughters. For sons, it
was closely linked to their occupational choices,
to getting a job that would command status and
money in the world and which might predispose
them to looking after their parents in their old
age. For daughters, education would prepare
them for their role in a society where what was
expected of wives and mothers was undergoing a
change. In addition, some mothers believed that
it would equip their daughters with the ability to
stand on their own feet should their marriages
break down or their husbands prove unreliable.
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Table 2 Age distribution of study population by school attendance and labour force participation in Pallabi and
Agargaon
Age Ever went to Currently in Engaged in Engaged in Age at first work
school (%) school (%) income work (%) wage work (%) (mean years)
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Pallabi
5–15 70 76 54 57 10 18 9 16 12.4 12.1
16–49 67 53 5 3 89 47 67 47 16.1 19.1
50+ 43 19 – – 80 22 59 13 17.2 29.0
All ages 58 51 15 16 59 32 45 31 16.2 19.1
Agargaon
5–15 75 76 62 63 12 11 8 11 10.6 17.3
16–49 38 20 1 0 95 38 21 33 15.8 21.2
50+ 33 0 – – 88 40 20 29 16.6 26.4
All ages 40 29 15 15 59 25 14 22 15.8 21.7
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This kind of reasoning explained why, despite
their poverty, many parents had struggled to
send and keep their children in school. At the
same time, there is a sizeable sample of parents
whose children either had never enrolled in
school or had dropped out of school. Presumably,
this second group of parents either did not
subscribe to these changing values about
education or else were unable to act on them. In
the rest of this article, we examine these two
groups in greater detail. We use our quantitative
data to ascertain how they differ from each other
and our qualitative data to interpret these
quantitative differences and to explore in
greater detail how they might lead to differences
in intergenerational contracts between the two
groups. Some of these differences are
statistically significant and offer causal insights
into the pattern of educational deficits. 
3.1 Household vulnerability and educational deficits 
Within the urban slum contexts where the
majority of households were poor, our data
suggests that it was vulnerabilities of various
kinds that explained differences in children’s
educational outcomes. As Chambers (1989) points
out, the concept of vulnerability encompasses both
‘external’ and ‘internal’ dimensions. The external
dimension refers to the likelihood of shocks and
stresses faced by households, both idiosyncratic to
specific households and those that are generalised
across households. The internal dimension, on the
other hand, refers to the capacity of different
households to cope with these threats to their
livelihoods and standard of living. Table 3
captures some of the differences in the capacity to
cope between households whose children were at
school and those where they were not. It suggests
that children were less likely to go to school in
households which did not own any assets, which
relied on causal labour as their primary source of
livelihood or which were headed by women. 
Our research material suggests that different
kinds of vulnerability tend to overlap. Thus,
casual labour households were vulnerable, in the
first instance, because of the irregularity and
unpredictability of their income flows. Their
mean income levels were lower than households
reliant on other kinds of occupations, and they
were less likely to report a surplus at the end of
the month. Their members generally earned on a
daily basis and did not always know if and how
much they would earn on a particular day. What
they ate each day depended on what they earned
each day. One husband and wife who worked
together in a brickfield earned on a literally
‘brick-by-brick’ basis: they were paid Tk35 for
every hundred bricks so that their earnings
varied by the number of bricks they managed to
break between them and the number of days
they managed to find work. 
In addition, casual labour households were also
vulnerable because they lacked some of the other
resources that could help them to cope with the
stresses and strains that were a routine part of
their lives. Such households owned fewer assets
than other households in our sample, were less
likely to report a surplus at the end of the month,
less likely to have access to formal sources of
loans or affiliations with non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and less likely to have
savings. 
Female-headed households were also characterised
by overlapping forms of disadvantage. They also
had lower levels of assets, were less likely to report
a surplus at the end of the month, were less likely
to have savings or access to formal sources of loans
and were less likely to be affiliated to a formal civil
society organisation. However, their economic
vulnerability did not necessarily stem from the
casual nature of their work: many worked in
garment factories or domestic work and were less
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Table 3 Household vulnerability and educational deficits
Children Children Significance*
not at at school
school
0–1 assets 55% 45% .000
2–4 assets 33% 67%
Casual labour 44% 56% .047
households (hhs)
Other hhs 37% 63%
Female-headed 67% 33% .000
hhs
Male-headed hhs 38% 63%
* Significance indicates the level of confidence we can
have in the results. In the statistical analysis for this
article, we have only reported on differences between
groups which were significant at at least 10% level of
confidence.
reliant on casual labour as their main source of
income than male-headed households. Instead,
their vulnerability was a product of gender-related
disadvantage. 
Many female household heads were divorced or
deserted. Jesmin and Salway (2000) talks about
‘serial monogamy’ to describe the marital
behaviour of men in his study of a Dhaka bastee
(slum neighbourhood). The marriage patterns
captured by our qualitative research suggested a
much greater diversity: some men left their
wives and were never seen again, others
contracted polygamous marriages, others
remarried but then returned for a while,
contributed to the marriage or expected their
wives to support them and then left again. Thus,
female headship was generally an indicator of
some form of marital crisis which had left the
wife to fend for herself and her children. Such
forms of crisis were usually associated with an
abrupt drop in household income. Most female
household heads were, therefore, primary
breadwinners for their households in a society in
which gender confined women to a far more
limited set of income-earning opportunities than
men. Most did not have any adult male members
in the household who could have earned, or
shared the burden of earning, the household
livelihood. Their mean incomes were not only
lower than those of male-headed households but
also lower than levels reported by other asset-
less and casual labour households. 
Anxiety about the future clearly had an objective
basis in reality for the more vulnerable
households within slum neighbourhoods, given
the variety of threats to which they were exposed
and the fragility of their household resource
base. In addition, for those who were engaged in
a constant struggle to keep their heads above
water, there was a strong subjective dimension to
their experience of vulnerability which limited
their ability to think ahead and plan for the
future. This was evident from the response given
by Shahjahan, a rickshaw puller who was asked
why he did not send his children to the free
government school in his locality: 
I don’t know anything about government free schools,
and I have no interest in knowing. My head is so full
of so many troubles – how my family can survive and
how we can continue? Really, I have no space in my
mind to think of schooling for my son, whether it is
free or not. Now I am in debt of 12,000 taka. I owe
1,000 taka to the local shop owner, I owe 1,000 taka
to a moneylender – he charges 200 taka per month
interest until I can pay off the full amount. The other
10,000 taka I owe to a rickshaw salesman. I entered
an agreement with this man whereby I pay 50 taka
per day until I have paid him the full 10,000 taka, he
doesn’t charge interest for delayed payment. From the
moment I took the rickshaw from him, the rickshaw
was mine. But for the last five days I have not been
able to pay any money. I need 2kg rice per day and the
house rent is 500 taka, I haven’t been able to pay this
for the last three months. 
Children from these different categories of
vulnerable households were less likely to be
enrolled in school – and more likely to drop out –
because of the ‘hand-to-mouth’ existence
imposed by low and uncertain earnings of their
households and the absence of an asset base to
fall back on in times of crisis. If the willingness to
invest in a child’s education requires the capacity
to imagine and plan for the future, as discussed
earlier in the article, these parents were largely
oriented to the present: they had ‘no space in
their mind’ to think about the future when the
present was so crowded with demands. They had
to discount any form of expenditure which not
only failed to meet their immediate needs, but
whose benefits were uncertain in terms of what
they might be and whether they might ever
materialise. Their explanations as to why they
did not send their children to school spelt out the
harsh nature of the trade-offs they faced: 
I have enough brains to know it is good to send the
children to school, but what can I do? Can anyone
study on an empty stomach? Will they first eat and
survive or will they first go to school and study? 
My father passed away four years ago. Although I
know that it is my duty to provide food for my parents,
I was unable to do so. I think that is the reason my
father died. I feel I failed him. My other brothers also
did not provide any food to our parents. My mother is
a beggar now. For a man who cannot even provide his
mother with food, tell me, how can he provide school
fees for children?
3.2 Endemic insecurity and educational deficits 
Our survey data helped us to identify particular
categories of vulnerable households who had
either failed to enrol their children in school or
had failed to keep them enrolled in school.
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However, our qualitative interviews highlighted
other kinds of insecurities, which had similar
effects. These could not be reduced to specific
threats and events but were woven into the
stressful fabric of daily life in urban slum
neighbourhoods. They partly reflected the
physical constitution of these neighbourhoods.
Excluded from the safer and higher valued
locations in the city, the poor were concentrated
in its more precarious sites: its fragile
embankments, garbage dumps and areas
through which other people’s effluent flowed
(Wood and Salway 2000). This made them
vulnerable to seasonal flooding, landslides and
the risk of disease. 
Insecurities were also generated by the structure
of livelihood opportunities in these
neighbourhoods. While the urban informal
economy is generally characterised by casual
waged and self employment in manufacturing,
trade and service activities, urban slum
neighbourhoods tend to be sites of various ‘anti-
social livelihood activities’, including theft, drug-
selling, gambling, professional begging and
prostitution, which flourish in slum areas, adding
a criminal underground element to the informal
economy (Khan 2001). 
In addition, insecurities inhered in the social
relationships prevailing in slum neighbourhoods.
‘Mafia-like’ gangs of mastaans (musclemen) acted
as intermediaries between slum dwellers and
local politicians, businessmen and other power-
holders. They also played a central role in the
underground economy. As Wood and Salway
(2000) put it, they operated like entrepreneurs of
a certain kind, exploiting the vulnerabilities of
the slum dwellers, on the one hand, and the
needs of politicians, officials, private sector
business and the middle classes for clients, cheap
labour, votes and so on, on the other. They
controlled access to housing, to livelihood
opportunities, to local amenities, including
illegal connections to public utilities through
their capacity for brokering patronage or using
violence, or the threat of violence. 
Violence in the slums has also escalated over the
past decade because of the increasingly
confrontational nature of national politics;
strikes, curfews and political conflicts have
become commonplace. 
Our qualitative data highlighted the relevance of
this wider context in shaping aspirations and
behaviour relevant to children’s access to
education. As one mother’s comments indicated,
attempts to cope with periodic episodes of
violence entailed constant interruptions to
children’s school attendance: 
I do not allow them to go outside when firing and
violence takes place. Severe fighting took place a few
days ago, full of bombs and gunfire. I stayed in the
house with my child keeping the door shut. His father
did not come home that night. When my son goes to
school, I do not let him go alone. I accompany him. I
am afraid for myself too while walking in the street.
Yesterday I was passing through this way and heard
the bombs blasting. When I feel very insecure, we move
away somewhere for a while, leaving this area.
Along with these periodic outbursts of violence, a
pervasive state of lawlessness and disorder kept
parents in a state of constant anxiety about the
safety of their children. Some relied on older
children to look after younger ones while they
were at work. Others took them to work with
them: women working in domestic service were
often able to do this. Still others put their
children to work: sending young girls to work in
domestic service or to factory employment was
another way of ensuring their security. Working
mothers had particular anxieties about leaving
young girls on their own in the house, because of
concerns about their sexual safety.1
However, parents’ anxieties did not only relate to
what harm might come to their children but also
to what their children themselves might get up to.
Children exercised considerable agency in shaping
educational outcomes and children described as
indifferent to schooling were also more likely to be
out of school. Children’s interactions with their
peers often served to undermine parental wishes.
Focus group discussions with fathers described
some of the negative influences of life in the slums,
which undermined children’s ability to study,
contrasting it with the greater order and discipline
of rural life: 
In rural areas, the environment is not so
undisciplined, there is no electricity, the children can’t
go anywhere, they have to sit with their books. Here in
the city, children don’t come home till after seven.
They just roam around. Those who have never studied,
they just play and when they get older, they go into
16
work, garments or in a shop. There are parents who
are just not aware of education, they are not interested
in educating their children. Those women who have
no husbands, but look after the children on their own,
they find it hard to educate their children. Their
children may come and go to school but they do not
study. 
Now the situation is so bad, there is just one film on
television after another. Sometimes, we disconnect the
TV when we leave the house, but the children manage
to reconnect it. If the TV is closed in our house, we
can hear everything from next door, their voices, their
TV. That is why village is good, no one watches TV
hour after hour. The children of the rich don’t get
spoilt because of TV because there are other forms of
help for them, private tutors and so on. 
Gender influenced the reasons why children
were not at school. Young girls who dropped out
of school tended to be influenced by the example
of other young girls like themselves who were
working for a living, usually in the garment
industry, and appeared to enjoy a greater degree
of freedom as well as having more money to
spend on themselves. They saw little point in
going to school: 
I wanted my daughter to study till matric, I wanted
her to become a nurse but she would not listen to me.
She has been living in a bastee and she has got
together with others living in the bastee. She has
friends who have given up studies, they have all gone
to work in the factories. They have made my daughter
understand that we are girls from the bastees, what do
we need with education? 
Boys dropped out to roam the neighbourhood
with gangs of other boys like themselves. Female
household heads faced particular problems
controlling unruly sons: they were more likely to
have to go out to work for a living and less likely
to have an adult male in the household to impose
discipline. One female head had decided that
sending her only son away to a madrassah which
had residential facilities was the only way to
remove him from the influence of the slums.
However, male household heads also faced
problems maintaining control over sons,
particularly if their wives were working. As one
father lamented: 
Earlier I had sent my eldest son to Rupnagar High
School. At that school the admission fee was 160 taka
and the tuition fees were 55 taka per month. I paid the
money regularly. My wife went to work in a garment
factory early in the morning, and I was also working
(in my little shop) all day, so neither of us was around
to make sure that he went to school. I thought my son
was attending school, but then I was told that his
admission had been cancelled due to lack of attendance,
so that is when I came to know that he hadn’t been
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Table 4 Aspirations and educational deficits
Children not Children at Significance*
at school school
Ideal education for sons: graduate level 15% 85% .000
Ideal education for sons: < graduate level 87% 13%
Ideal education for daughters: graduate level 12% 88% .000
Ideal education for daughters: < graduate level 68% 32%
Aspires to salaried job in future 20% 80% .000
Others 64% 36%
Aspires to garment factory job 71% 29% .000
Others 33% 67%
Child not interested in school 75% 25% .000
Child interested in school 33% 67%
* Significance indicates the level of confidence we can have in the results. In the statistical analysis for this article, we
have only reported on differences between groups which were significant at at least 10% level of confidence.
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going to school. When his admission was cancelled for
the second time, I realised it was pointless sending him
to school … I decided it was better if he worked with
his mother in the garments factory. He worked there for
three months, but then he left. He has not given me an
explanation of why he left the factory. I think that my
son is a total vagabond. 
The importance of values and aspirations as an
influence on which children went to school and
which did not is evident from Table 4. It tells us
that parents who would like their sons and
daughters to achieve graduate-level education
are more likely to report children in school than
those with lower aspirations. Parents who aspire
to salaried jobs for their children are more likely
to have children attending school while those
who intend to send their children into garment
factory jobs are less likely to have children at
school. Finally, children who express indifference
to education are also less likely to be at school.
3.3 Failures of provision: the ‘costs’ of education
For parents facing unruly children, a priority was
to find some way of disciplining them. Both work
and school offered the possibility of security as
well as a measure of discipline. However, here
certain aspects of educational provision in the
slums militated against the extent to which
schools could serve such a role (Table 5). The first
related to the perceived quality of education. 
Government neglect of the slums had resulted in
extremely inadequate forms of provision, in
terms of quantity as well as quality. While there
was some NGO provision, it was not able to
compensate for government failure. As both
parents and teachers pointed out, there was
more government support for education in rural
areas than in urban. Some parents talked about
sending their children back to the village for
education to take advantage of the food-for-
education scheme and for government stipends.
The headmaster of a semi-government school in
one of the slums agreed that government neglect
played an important role in explaining poor
educational outcomes in slum neighbourhoods.
Apathy on the part of government led to apathy
on the part of teachers as well as various forms of
‘unruly behaviour’. Focus group discussions with
children elicited a torrent of complaints: 
That school is not good, they just want to eat more
money … Rules were good before, but now there are no
rules. They used to give students food and books but
now they just demand money. Teachers beat students if
they are late coming to school … They tell us to write
in the classroom and then they go out for a stroll to the
park, to Zia gardens, to parliament buildings … We
go to school at 8am and at 12 o’clock, the teachers
come back from the park and say, ‘Students, class time
is over, go home’. If we cannot read or write, they do
not teach us, they just beat us … If one student
cannot read or write, they beat all the students.
The other frequently cited factor was the
perceived cost of education. As Table 5 shows,
parents who perceived education to be costly were
far less likely to enrol children in school than the
rest. The household survey suggested that of
households with at least one child currently in
school, 58 per cent paid annual tuition fees, 54 per
cent paid session fees, 54 per cent paid for books
and stationery, 33 per cent paid for exam fees, 17
per cent paid towards the child’s tiffin (lunch) and
17 per cent paid for a private tutor. These costs
are clearly likely to be a deterrent for parents who
earn very little and often irregularly. And while
only 17 per cent were paying for a private tutor,
private tuition was increasingly seen as a
prerequisite for getting on in school and for
passing exams. One educational practitioner we
interviewed referred to the ‘phantom private
tuition system’ that propped up public educational
provision, tuition that was recommended and
provided by the very teachers who taught them
within the public system. Despite all these
problems, there was sufficient enthusiasm for
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Table 5 Quality and costs of provision and educational deficits
Children not at school Children at school Significance
Perceives education quality to be poor 62% 38% .000
Others 36% 64%
Perceives education to be costly 94% 6% .000
Others 28% 72%
schooling as a ‘social good’ expressed during focus
group discussions to suggest that committed
efforts at community mobilisation by government
or NGO to overcome some of these obstacles
could pay positive dividends.
4 Disrupting the intergenerational transmission
of poverty: some policy implications 
We suggested at the start of this article that
transmission of human capital deficits across
generations, exemplified by the failure to invest
in children’s education, was a major factor driving
the intergenerational transmission of poverty.
This suggests a degree of path dependence in life
trajectories across generations. The children of
household heads (but not spouses) who are
themselves uneducated are less likely to go to
school (Table 6). They are less likely to have
worldviews that give value to education or to
imagine a life for their children very different
from the one that they themselves have had.
There are also broader social pressures
reinforcing these processes. Children are less
likely to go to school when they grow up in
communities in which very few children go to
school, where the pressure of peers works to
discourage school attendance, and where they
perceive their own life chances in terms which
provide few incentives to go to school.
However, while some degree of path dependence
may explain why so many children in the urban
slums do not go to school, there is enough
evidence from the same slums to suggest that
this future was not pre-ordained. We have
focused in this article on those parents who
failed to send their children to school or failed to
keep their children at school. A very different
story emerges if we explore the experiences of
those parents who managed, despite their
poverty, to enrol their children in school and
keep them there long enough for them to
complete primary and, in some cases, secondary
education. There are stories of enormous
sacrifices by both parents and children. They
testify to the fact that, although the odds are
against them, uneducated parents need not
necessarily produce uneducated children. 
A first set of responses relates to the persistence
of educational deficits. A first set of responses
relate to ideas and aspirations. It is evident from
our findings that parents who aspire to higher
education for their children and who imagine a
different future for themselves than their own life
experiences might have led them to expect are
more likely to value education and to ensure that
their children go to school. While parents’ own
education level is one factor in shaping these
aspirations, it is not the only factor. Another
important factor has been the role of the
government. While the government in
Bangladesh has largely failed to promote
educational opportunities for the urban poor, its
campaign to raise public awareness about the
value of education appears to have made a
difference. Many of the parents we interviewed
used the government slogan about illiteracy: ‘we
have eyes, but we cannot see’. A proactive stance
by the government can make a difference
because, despite all its failings, the government
continues to have a presence and legitimacy in
the eyes of the poor that is not matched by other
institutions, including NGOs. 
A second set of responses relates to the provision
of educational services. The greater likelihood
that parents with some education are more likely
to ensure their children’s schooling highlights the
importance of educating the current generation
of children if the cycle of poverty is to be broken.
Simply getting children into schools is only the
beginning of the challenge. First-generation
learners in a family are known to require a higher
level of support and commitment from parents
and from teachers. Their parents are not
accustomed to the idea that children need to
attend school regularly to benefit; that they
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Table 6 Parents’ education and educational deficits of children 
Children not at school Children at school Significance
Head has no education 44% 56% .030
Head has some education 36% 64%
Spouse has no education 38% 62% .066
Spouse has some education 46% 54%
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should not be withdrawn to do household chores
or step in for a breadwinner when the household
faces a crisis; that they should be encouraged to
do homework. In addition, parents are unable to
give them the help they may need at home to
guide them in their homework. Actively involving
parents and teachers to meet this challenge,
designing the school curriculum and educational
materials to transform school attendance into a
joyful rather than alienating experience, holding
teachers accountable for ensuring teaching
standards within the classroom that do not
necessitate additional private tuition, offering life
skills which prepare children to participate in the
wider society and economy: educational policy
will clearly have to be thought about more
imaginatively than is currently the case. 
Finally, however, there is a need to consider the
very real material constraints that lie behind the
failure to send and keep children at school. As we
have seen, it is the more vulnerable households,
those headed by women or primarily reliant on
earnings from casual labour, that are less likely
than the rest of the population to send their
children to school. While there are various NGOs
active in our study neighbourhoods, and NGO
membership is associated with higher likelihood
of children attending school, the more vulnerable
households are less likely to belong to an NGO.
NGO membership appears to operate through
building the asset base of low-income households
rather than influencing values and aspirations,
suggesting the importance of material pathways
of change. Clearly, some form of basic safety net
that tides households through periods of crisis
could make an enormous difference to their
capacity to keep their children at school. Given
the significance of health-related expenditures
as a major factor in perpetuating and
exacerbating poverty, security of access to basic
health services might allow parents to aspire to,
and afford, education for their children. 
5 Concluding comments
Returning to the idea of continuities and
transitions in intergenerational contracts within
the family, it is clear from our findings that there
are many more influences at work than our very
simple framework allowed for. We did not
investigate the affective dimension of these
contracts but we are able to make a number of
points about questions of personal agency and
changing time horizons. We suggested people’s
sense of personal agency increased as far as family
formation processes were concerned with the
decline in child mortality and the greater
availability of family planning. However, it is clear
that sense of agency is also shaped by the larger
context in which families find themselves and that
many of those we interviewed did not feel that they
had much control over their lives: this partly
reflected the vulnerability of their own households
as well as the endemic insecurity of the
environment in which they lived. Questions of
agency had a close bearing on their ability to think
in terms of the future: as one harassed father put
it, they did not have the ‘space in their minds’ to
think about their children’s current educational
options and certainly none to plan for the future. 
What was also missing in our analytical
framework was any attention to the possibility of
children exercising agency in shaping educational
outcomes. Yet this was clearly a factor. Children’s
preferences were likely to be strongly influenced
by parents’ views but they were also shaped by
the views and behaviour of their peers. Children’s
own interest in education as well as the example
set by their peers played an important role in
explaining which children stayed in school and
which dropped out. Policies to address the
intergenerational transmission of poverty
through educational deficits will have to factor
children’s views and values into their design. 
Notes
1 An attempted rape at 3 o’clock in the afternoon
close to where our interview was taking place
brought home how real these fears were. An
old man had entered a neighbouring house to
rape a 12-year-old girl who had been left on her
own while her mother went out to work. The
neighbours heard her screaming and came to
her rescue. The men of the area paraded the
old man through the neighbourhood to shame
him. Our respondent said: ‘You see, now you
understand why we are so afraid for our
daughters.  But if that man had political
connections, could anyone have done anything?’
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